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P = E² AND OTHER THOUGHTS ON WHAT IS THE
VALUE OF PARTICIPATION?
MICHAEL J. PITTS*
Participation in elections has become a sexy topic among legal
academics in recent years, and with every election it seems to be the gift
that keeps on giving. Bush v. Gore1 with all its mayhem (punch-card
ballots, late military votes, errors in ballot design) sparked the fire. Federal
intervention via the Help America Vote Act2 (money for new voting
machines, statewide voter registration databases, the mandate of provisional
ballots, identification requirements for certain voters) stoked the flame. The
Republican takeover of numerous state governments in 20103 (more
widespread passage of strict voter identification requirements, limitations
on early voting) created a conflagration. And the presidential election of
2012 (long lines on Election Day) led to a newly formed bipartisan
commission on election reform to try and douse the blaze that has become
American election administration.4
Professor Chad Flanders deserves commendation for taking a step back
from the inferno surrounding participation in elections to identify
underlying values of participation and what these values might mean for
some recent events in election administration. The four values of
participation he posits are: legitimacy, expression, information, and
equality.5 He then evaluates some of the contentious issues described in
Professor Richard Hasen’s The Voting Wars6 in relation to these four
participatory values, and speculates as to whether the voting wars can ever
be brought to a conclusion in light of the participatory values Professor
Flanders has identified.7
* Professor of Law and Dean’s Fellow, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law. Thanks to Professor Josh Douglas for his helpful comments.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 36, 42, 43 U.S.C.).
3. See Michael J. Pitts, Photo ID, Provisional Balloting, and Indiana’s 2012 Primary
Election, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 939 (2013).
4. See Exec. Order No. 13,639, 78 Fed. Reg. 19,979 (Mar. 28, 2013) (establishing the
Presidential Commission on Election Administration).
5. Chad Flanders, What Is the Value of Participation?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 53, 56-62
(2013).
6. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT
ELECTION MELTDOWN (2012).
7. Flanders, supra note 5, at 62-78.
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After reflecting upon Professor Flanders’s well-constructed insights, I
make three points. First, Professor Flanders’s framework relates almost
exclusively to the participatory values of individual voters and to society as
a whole. From this perspective, my contention will be that there are really
only two values that matter—expression and equality—and that if those two
values are satisfied, then all will be well with American democracy. My
second move will then be in a totally different direction, contending that if
Professor Flanders wants to embrace a more expansive list of values, the
list needs to expand to include the values of participation not only as to
voters and society as a whole, but also as to political partisans. Put simply,
participation is a value for partisan politicians as a political issue they can
use to get out the vote. The third point will be an extension of focusing on
the political and will present some musings about an exit strategy from the
voting wars. Here, I posit that the voting wars will only conclude (or at least
simmer down) when political shifts occur to prevent the two major political
parties from using electoral laws and practices to target certain easily
identified groups of voters.
I. Two Values, Not Four
Professor Flanders identifies four values of participation: legitimacy,
expression, information, and equality.8 For a moment, allow me to briefly
summarize his values with a focus on the aspects necessary to the points I
wish to make.
o

Legitimacy. Professor Flanders sees the ability to participate in
elections as having a value of legitimacy.9 The fact that citizens
participate in elections legitimizes the government’s authority
over the collective. Importantly, Professor Flanders emphasizes
participation as having a legitimacy value from a societal
perspective because whether an individual actually participates
does not matter much for purposes of legitimacy; what’s
important is that enough people participate (or have a reasonable
opportunity to participate) to achieve the value of legitimacy for
the democracy as a whole.10

8. Id. at 56-62.
9. See id. at 56-58.
10. See id. at 57-58. To be fair, Professor Flanders does recognize at the end of his
discussion that if an individual is denied the ability to vote (that is, denied a “reasonable
chance” to participate) then the legitimacy of the government’s power over that individual is
called into question. Id. at 57. But this point is minor and relatively tangential to his focus.
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o

Expression. Professor Flanders views the act of casting a ballot
as having an expressive value. Casting a ballot shows others
“what we think and believe.”11 Going to the polls declares
yourself to be a citizen and your selection of a candidate (or,
presumably, one side of a referenda question) expresses your
political beliefs.12 Importantly, Professor Flanders’s focus here is
on an individual’s ability to express himself or herself.

o

Information. Professor Flanders notes how aggregating the votes
of numerous individuals provides information to elected officials
about what society desires in terms of substantive policies.13
While this is an imperfect, not narrowly tailored, and noisy—at
least in contrast to a straight-up opinion poll14—mechanism for
providing information, there is no doubt elections provide
informational value to government officials.

o

Equality. Equality is about the distribution of the franchise
among groups.15 Professor Flanders recognizes that equality is
not a participatory value per se but relates to the distribution of
participation.16 Here, similar to his legitimacy value, Professor
Flanders’s focus is not on individual equality but on
participatory equality between societal groups (for example,
those defined by race, gender, age, or socioeconomic status).17

These are the four values Professor Flanders recognizes, and they are
fine values; but they are not the end of the story. Recognizing values in
relation to participation has little relevance unless we use these values to
structure democracy. Put differently, values of participation should serve as
guideposts for decision-makers—whether they be legislators, judges, or
election administrators—about how the democratic game should be
organized. Of course, Professor Flanders readily recognizes the necessity of

11. Id. at 58.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 59-60.
14. See id. at 60.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 60-61 (“[I]f equal participation is a value, it is neither intrinsic to democracy,
nor even intrinsic to the individual’s right to participate. One’s right to participate is not
necessarily diminished by the fact that others cannot participate.”).
17. See id.
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applying his participatory values by assessing various aspects of the “voting
wars” in relation to these values.18
Yet in terms of thinking about participation and how participation should
be structured in American democracy, the two “Es”—expression and
equality—are probably the only values that matter in Professor Flanders’s
taxonomy. In other words, if a democracy properly adheres to the values of
expression and equality, the values of legitimacy and information naturally
follow.
Let us look at legitimacy first. Professor Flanders says that legitimacy
flows primarily from some amount—perhaps a critical mass—of the
citizenry having the chance to participate and secondarily from an
individual having a “reasonable chance” to cast a ballot.19 Professor
Flanders also notes that it is consistent with having a “democracy” to not
allow all groups of persons to participate—noting that America was still a
democracy even before women and African Americans (and, presumably,
other historically excluded groups—Native Americans, non-property
owners, etc.) fully gained the franchise.20
But, notably, at this point in his article, Professor Flanders does not refer
to America as being a legitimate democracy,21 and rightly so. Professor
Flanders is a savvy scholar, so, presumably, omission of the word
“legitimate” is intentional. I would submit that while America was
technically a democracy when it excluded large swaths of the population
from participation, it was not a truly or fully legitimate democracy. And I
have a sneaking suspicion Professor Flanders would agree.22
My point here is that legitimacy will flow naturally from allowing
groups and individuals equally reasonable chances to express themselves at
the ballot box. Any democratic structure that allows all individuals a
reasonable opportunity to vote and does not exclude (or unreasonably
hinder) a particular segment of persons will be legitimate. Put simply, if we
adhere to the values of expression and equality, we ipso facto will have
legitimacy; if we do not adhere to the values of expression and equality, we
will still have a democracy, but it will not be a truly or fully legitimate
democracy.
18. See id. at 62-73.
19. Id. at 56-58.
20. See id. at 57.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 63 (describing how the denial of the vote to women and African
Americans “made the United States less of a democracy” and “was a less-legitimate
government then it might have otherwise been”).
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However, I would add one potential caveat to the notion of the value of
legitimacy automatically flowing naturally from the values of expression
and equality and, in doing so, perhaps suggest another value that could
explicitly be added to Professor Flanders’s taxonomy—the value of
integrity.23 Here, what I am talking about is the prevention of fraud. It
seems to me that one could have a democratic structure that allows all
individuals a reasonable opportunity to vote and does not distribute the
franchise unequally among groups, but that unreasonably24 allows for
elections to be stolen.
Professor Flanders implicitly subsumes the value of integrity within his
value of legitimacy but, in my view, the value of integrity could also be
subsumed within the value of equality. Professor Flanders implies that
stolen elections violate the value of legitimacy when he writes: “[T]he
results of the election might (again, if fraud is truly widespread), at the
limit, mean that American politics is only quasi-legitimate.”25 But it is
possible also to view a stolen election as violating the value of equality
because the group that voted for the candidate (or ballot measure) against
whom the fraud was perpetrated would have its equality violated.
Having considered whether the legitimacy value flows from adhering to
the values of expression and equality, let us shift to whether the information
value identified by Professor Flanders flows from adhering to expression
and equality as well. Professor Flanders points out that participation is a
means to the end of information—letting elected officials know what the
public wants.26 Again, though, so long as everyone has a reasonable
opportunity to express their views at the ballot box and so long as no
inequality exists among groups of voters, the value of information will
concomitantly follow. Put differently, if we want to get proper information
23. Professor Flanders implies that integrity is folded into his participatory values. See
id. at 67 (“But it is important to note . . . that the value of participation seems to be on both
sides of the debate. Those who worry about fraud . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
24. I use the word “unreasonably” here to create a parallel with the participatory values
already delimited by Professor Flanders. His position is that there is no violation of
legitimacy if someone is unable to vote so long as there is a reasonable opportunity to vote.
Id. at 57, 70. Similarly, it seems to me that there is no violation of an integrity value if fraud
occurs so long as reasonable steps were taken to maintain integrity.
25. Id. at 68. It is not entirely clear to me whether widespread fraud that leads to
incorrect results would violate Professor Flanders’s value of legitimacy. Professor Flanders
implies that legitimacy can be achieved even when a group of voters is systematically
excluded. See id. at 57-58, 68-69. If this is the case, then stolen elections might not violate
Professor Flanders’s legitimacy value.
26. Id. at 59.
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to elected officials, we need to get a representative sample to vote. And so
long as everyone has a reasonable individual opportunity to cast a ballot
and no inequality exists among groups, we should get that representative
sample. Or, at the very least, it will be the best representative sample we
can generate. In short, the information value is achieved by ensuring the
values of expression and equality are followed.
At this point, you might ask, so what? Professor Flanders has four
values, and I see only two from which Professor Flanders’s other two
values will naturally flow. Big deal. Moreover (and in fairness), Professor
Flanders hints that equality might be the most important value to uphold.27
Yet I think there is merit in keeping things simple—in keeping one’s
eyes squarely focused on the most important values. The values that above
all else need to be maintained. To make an analogy, businesses often
flounder when they forget about their core mission. Take, for instance, J.C.
Penney’s attempt to eliminate coupons for its customers28 or the New
Orleans Times-Picayune’s decision to forego printing a newspaper seven
days a week.29 In both instances, businesses abandoned their core missions
only to flounder and then return to their bread and butter—in J.C. Penney’s
case by returning to coupons30 and in the Times-Picayune’s case by
27. See, e.g., id. at 72 (“The voting wars get serious when they implicate not only
participation, but equal participation.”); id. at 73 (“[W]e should be especially attentive to
violations of the value of equal participation.”); id. at 75 (“At the end of the day equal
participation probably ends up as the main issue in the voting wars.”). Interestingly,
Professor Josh Douglas criticizes Professor Flanders for focusing too much on the value of
equality. Joshua A. Douglas, The Foundational Importance of Participation: A Response to
Professor Flanders, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 81, 83-89 (2013). Professor Douglas notes that not
allowing anyone to vote at all would be consistent with equality but would not be consistent
with democracy. See id. at 85. Professor Douglas believes that this sort of analysis would let
the government off the hook for long lines at an election, so long as the long lines impacted
voters equally. Id. at 90-93. However, I think Professor Flanders’s embrace of the value of
expression serves as a reasonable counter to Professor Douglas’s critique. Long lines can
make it difficult for an individual to express himself or herself by the act of voting and,
therefore, it would violate Professor Flanders’s values to have unreasonably long lines even
if no group inequality was created.
28. Meghan Casserly, How J.C. Penney’s Coupon Problem Discounts Women, FORBES
(May 17, 2012, 4:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2012/05/17/howjcpenneys-coupon-problem-discounts-women/.
29. David Carr, Newspaper Monopoly That Lost Its Grip, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/13/business/media/in-new-orleans-times-picayunes-mono
poly-crumbles.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
30. Abram Brown, Why Is J.C. Penney Rallying Around Another Massive Quarterly
Loss?, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2013, 8:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2013/
08/20/why-is-j-c-penney-rallying-around-another-massive-quarterly-loss/.
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resuming a print version.31 Similarly, when we want decision-makers—
legislators, judges, or election administrators—to make decisions about
structuring democracy in relation to participatory values (which is the
ultimate end of identifying values), we want them to focus on the core
values. The core values are expression and equality.
II. Another Value?
Having just critiqued Professor Flanders for being over-expansive in his
list of participatory values, I will now use my law professor’s license to
critique him in a diametrically opposed manner. It is possible to argue that
Professor Flanders does not adequately recognize the value of participation
as a political issue.
To begin this vein of my critique, it is important to assess the frame from
which Professor Flanders analyzes the value of participation. When
Professor Flanders discusses the value of participation, he generally
discusses it from the vantage point of an individual voter or from that of
society as a whole. For instance, from the perspective of the individual
voter, participation provides the ability to express himself or herself,
legitimizes the government’s power over that individual, and allows that
particular voter to provide information to government officials.32 From the
perspective of society, participation provides a government that has
legitimate authority to regulate behavior and provides government officials
with information that tells them how to structure their regulation of
society.33
Yet it might be helpful to think of participation not just as a value to
individual voters or to society as whole, but also as a value to partisan
politicians. To be sure, Professor Flanders’s identification of participatory
values could be interpreted to account for partisan politicians to some
extent. The information that partisan politicians receive from participation
helps them shape their legislative agendas and craft future campaigns.
But there would seem to be another value of participation to partisan
politicians—the value of using participation as a political strategy. Here, I
am not talking about partisans structuring the participation process in an
effort to make victory more likely for their own candidates—for instance,
by Republicans passing a strict voter identification law for the purpose of

31. Carr, supra note 29.
32. See Flanders, supra note 5, at 56-60.
33. See id.
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reducing the number of Democratic voters34 or Democrats expanding voter
registration opportunities to boost the number of Democratic voters.35
Instead, what I am talking about is participation as a political football—as a
campaign issue to get out the vote.
The value of participation as a political strategy seemed to take hold for
the Democratic Party in the 2012 presidential election. The data suggests
that while overall participation rates were lower in 2012 than they were in
2008 and 2004,36 the turnout rate for African American voters increased.37
What is interesting here is that the increase in the turnout rate for African
Americans may have been fueled by anger over what were perceived as
voter suppression tactics (passage of strict voter identification laws,
reductions in the days for early voting, etc.) by Republicans.38 Indeed,

34. See, e.g., Timothy Noah, Art of War, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/magazine/politics/105740/republican-voter-suppression-pennsylvan
ia-id (quoting the Republican majority leader of the Pennsylvania House as saying, “Voter
ID, which is going to allow Governor [Mitt] Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania?
Done.” (alteration in original)).
35. For example, Democrats passed the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (the so-called “Motor Voter” law), with majorities in both the
House and Senate, and President Clinton in the White House. See Final Vote Results for Roll
Call 154, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/
evs/1993/roll154.xml (last visited Sept. 2, 2013) (House of Representatives vote); U.S.
Senate Roll Call Votes 103rd Congress—1st Session, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=1&vote=0011
8 (last visited Sept. 2, 2013) (Senate vote).
36. See Voter Turnout, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.
htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2013).
37. See William H. Frey, Minority Turnout Determined the 2012 Election, BROOKINGS
INST. (May 10, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/10-election-2012minority-voter-turnout-frey.
38. John Nichols, How Voter Backlash Against Voter Suppression Is Changing Our
Politics, NATION (Apr. 29, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/174095/howvoter-backlash-against-voter-suppression-changing-our-politics# (“But the Reverend Al
Sharpton, the president of the National Action Network . . . says anger over voter
suppression did much to alter the [voter turnout] dynamic. ‘From the tours we did in 22
states, it became clear to us that many blacks that were apathetic and indifferent became
outraged and energized when they realized that [Republicans] were changing the rules in the
middle of the game, in terms of voter ID laws, ending “souls to the polls.”’” (third alteration
in original)); see also Roland Martin, GOP Voter Suppression Fueled Black Turnout, CNN
(updated Nov. 10, 2012, 10:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/09/opinion/martin-blackvote.
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participation was tested as a political message during the 2012 campaign
by Democrats and found to be an effective one.39
And I suspect that Republicans use participation as a political strategy as
well—just from a different angle. Republicans use participation as a
political strategy to get out their voters by raising the specter of voter fraud.
The “meme” goes something along the lines of “The Democrats are going
to steal the election with fraudulent votes; get out there and vote so they
can’t steal it.” This drives up turnout amongst the Republican base
concerned about the integrity of the electoral process.
It is undoubtedly true that one could see political strategy as a
participatory value outside of the ability to participate per se, but that does
not matter. For instance, other values (legitimacy, expression, and
information) identified by Professor Flanders directly flow from the casting
of a ballot at an election. Participation as a political message, though, does
not similarly flow from exercising the right to the franchise. But the fact
that the value of participation as a political message does not directly flow
from the act of participating should not be a barrier for Professor Flanders
because he already recognizes a value—equality—that he himself admits is
outside of the ability to participate per se.40
All that said, while I think political strategy can be placed alongside the
participation values Professor Flanders has identified, let me emphasize that
I am not certain it should be placed alongside those values. Again, my
initial point is that the only two values we need to focus on in relation to
participation are the two “Es”—expression and equality—and that if we get
them right, every other value we want out of participation will follow.
However, if we are going to expand the list of participatory values in the
manner in which Professor Flanders has, then we should include
participation as a political strategy within that list.

39. Ari Berman, The GOP’s Voter Suppression Strategy, NATION (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://www.thenation.com/article/171404/gops-voter-suppression-strategy#axzz2dyOnJ7tw
(“In late September, Project New America, a Denver center-left research group, tested more
than thirty messages on ‘sporadic, less likely voters who lean Democratic’ (which included
young, black and Hispanic voters) to see what would motivate them to vote. ‘One of the
most powerful messages across many different demographics was reminding people that
their votes were important to counter the extremists who are kicking people off of voter
rolls,’ the group wrote in a post-election memo.”).
40. See Flanders, supra note 5, at 60.
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III. Ending the Voting Wars
Discussion of politics and equality also leads to my final point in relation
to Professor Flanders’s article, and that final point involves finding a way to
call a truce to the “voting wars.” Professor Flanders notes that Professor
Hasen—who coined the phrase “voting wars”—is “less sanguine about
solving them.”41 And Professor Flanders seems equally skeptical that
“quick fixes or immediate solutions” will present themselves.42 Instead,
Professor Flanders wants to focus on how to approach the problems of the
voting wars by: (1) “consider[ing] participation mostly as a value and less
so as a right’”; (2) “be[ing] especially attentive to violations of the value of
equal participation”; and (3) “be[ing] humble in attempting to fix the
problem of political polarization by fixing our electoral machinery.”43
While there is nothing necessarily wrong with any of these suggestions,
my own view is that the way to put a significant dent in the voting wars
would involve some combination of more integrated political parties and
less racially polarized voting, therefore leading to a reduced ability to target
groups through manipulation of electoral structures and information.
Take an example of a problem from the voting wars that Professor
Flanders discusses—the problem of deliberate attempts to deceive or
intimidate.44 Typically, these stories involve attempts to dissuade voters of
racial and ethnic minority groups (for example, African Americans,
Latinos, or Native Americans) from casting ballots, sometimes by
providing these voters with misinformation. For example, during the 2010
election in Maryland, more than 100,000 homes in the predominantly
African American jurisdictions in the state were targeted with a robocall
telling them to “relax” because Democratic Governor Martin O’Malley had
won—even though the polls had not closed!45 Put simply, African
American Democrats were targeted with misinformation to keep them away
from the voting booth.
Or take what is perhaps the quintessential battle of the voting wars—
strict voter identification laws that require prospective voters to present
41. Id. at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also HASEN, supra note 6.
42. Flanders, supra note 5, at 73.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 69-70.
45. Luke Broadwater, Schurick Guilty of Election Fraud in Robocall Case, BALT. SUN
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-12-06/news/bs-md-schurick-robocallsverdict-20111206_1_prosecutor-emmet-c-davitt-robocall-election-fraud; Sherrilyn A. Ifill,
Black Voters Told, ‘Relax, Don’t Vote’, ROOT (Dec. 7, 2011, 12:41 AM), http://www.the
root.com/views/black-voters-told-relax-don-t-vote.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss1/5

2013]

P = E² AND OTHER THOUGHTS

111

government-issued photo identification as a condition of casting a
countable ballot. These laws appear aimed at suppressing the vote of
reliably Democratic voters, such as African American citizens, because
African American citizens may be less likely to have government-issued
photo identification.
To me, these two areas demonstrate the underlying root causes of the
voting wars. First, we have a group of persons—African American voters—
who overwhelmingly side with one particular party—the Democratic
Party.46 Second, we have a group of voters who are easily identified by
geographic segregation. In Maryland, you could suppress the vote by
choosing the right zip code to target for voter suppression. Thus, due to
patterns of political support and residential segregation, it is easy to target a
particular group of voters for, say, misinformation.
If groups of voters less predictably vote for one party and are not easily
targeted because of residential segregation, then there will be a sharp
curtailing of the voting wars. Perhaps it is useful to consider gender to make
this point. One rarely hears about voter suppression through manipulation
of election administration rules or misinformation aimed at women. I would
submit that this is because those voters are not easily identified as
overwhelmingly voting for one political party over another and also
because women are not easily targeted due to the fact that they are not
residentially segregated. If the group is overwhelmingly in favor of one
political party and easily identified, voter suppression is cheap, easy, and
likely to pay off. If the group is more mixed in its partisan affiliation and
more dispersed, voter suppression is costly, difficult, and not as likely to
pay off because you may end up targeting some of your supporters.
My point is that to end the voting wars, we will probably have to curb
the underlying root causes. And the same can be said for other problems
related to election law. Take the issue of representation (or lack thereof) for
racial and ethnic minority voters and the creation of majority-minority
districts to provide fair representation for those voters.47 The root cause of
the issue is racially polarized voting, as no voting rights claim against an

46. To be fair, the scenario for suppression, such as occurred in Maryland, does not
necessarily need to be one where a Democrat is matched up against a Republican. It could
happen in a Democratic primary where an African American candidate and a white
candidate are contesting the election and where racially polarized voting occurs.
47. This is a problem that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act attempts to solve. See
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)).
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electoral structure goes forward without proof of racially polarized voting.48
Thus, if we found a way to eliminate racially polarized voting, the Voting
Rights Act would essentially be rendered obsolete. Same with the voting
wars. They can be rendered obsolete when groups of voters more equally
disperse between the major political parties and, therefore, cannot be as
easily targeted.
To be clear, I am not optimistic that at any time in the near future we will
have more integrated political parties and less capability to target groups of
persons through changes in electoral laws and practices. For starters, if
Latinos, who now comprise the nation’s largest minority group,49 continue
to move toward the Democratic Party in increasingly large numbers, then
there will be more voting wars related to the targeting of Latinos.50
Moreover, while the Obama campaigns’ legendary microtargeting of voters
can be used as a tool for “good” to generate turnout, presumably it could
also be used as a tool for “evil” to suppress turnout.51 This is unfortunate,
but reality.
Conclusion
To sum up, Professor Flanders makes a useful contribution to the
election administration dialogue by delimiting the values of participation.
His framework, though, can be critiqued as both overbroad and underbroad.
That aside, I am skeptical that identifying these values and applying these
values will lead to much movement in the voting wars, for the voting wars
will likely only conclude through political change that eliminates the root
symptoms that make it possible for these wars to be fought in the first
place.

48. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
49. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Asians FastestGrowing Race or Ethnic Group in 2012, Census Bureau Reports (June 13, 2013), available
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